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Abstract—As we observe a trend towards the recentralisation
of the Internet, this paper raises the question of guaranteeing
an everlasting decentralisation. We introduce the properties of
strong and soft uncentralisability in order to describe systems
in which all authorities can be untrusted at any time without
affecting the system. We link the soft uncentralisability to another
property called perfect forkability. Using that knowledge, we
introduce a new cryptographic primitive called uncentralisable
ledger and study its properties. We use those properties to analyse
what an uncentralisable ledger may offer to classic electronic
voting systems and how it opens up the realm of possibilities for
completely new voting mechanisms. We review a list of selected
projects that implement voting systems using blockchain technol-
ogy. We then conclude that the true revolutionary feature enabled
by uncentralisable ledgers is a self-sovereign and distributed
identity provider.
Index Terms—blockchain, decentralisation, uncentralisability,
forkability, ledger, vote, bitcoin, ethereum
I. RECENTRALISATION OF THE INTERNET
The Internet has been designed as a decentralised network.
Each Internet server is a central authority node that has full
control over the services it provides. Unlike a distributed
network, where each node is independent, this kind of decen-
tralised network still relies on multiple authorities [1]. This
topology is sometimes referred as ”federated network” while
”decentralised network” has evolved to cover both a federated
or a distributed network [2].
It is important to note that technically federated or dis-
tributed networks are still considered as centralised if all nodes
are managed by a single root of authority or trust [3]. We can
infer that if some authorities in a distributed network control
a large number of nodes, the network is mostly a federation
of those authorities, even if technically looking distributed.
If the technical layers that allowed to build the Internet
are decentralised, there is a natural social and economic
incentive to recentralise, at least politically and economically
[4]. We observe that the Internet is currently moving toward
centralisation [5].
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It is now cheaper, more efficient and often technically more
secure to run applications on Amazon S3 instead of your
server, to post on Facebook instead of your website or to
have your emails on Google instead of maintaining a mail
hosting infrastructure. This recentralisation of the Internet
in mega-silos can be witnessed as more and more traffic
goes through Google and Facebook alone [6]. The power
of very few companies over the whole internet makes those
companies as powerful as states, prompting the name ”Net
states” [7]. The control of the Internet by a few companies is
not limited to user traffic. It goes as far as building their own
Internet infrastructure [8], including cross-oceanic cables [9].
For some, this recentralisation is even seen as the death of the
Internet [10].
II. DEFINING DECENTRALISED SYSTEMS
We use the term ”political centralisation” to describe a
system where the decisions are taken by one central authority,
even if the system may be distributed from a technical point
of view. Troncoso, Isaakidis, Danezis and Halpin [3] suggest
that technical distribution is not relevant in this context and
that only political centralisation matters. They define a de-
centralised system as ”A distributed system in which multiple
authorities control different components and no single author-
ity is fully trusted by all others”. In that context, an authority
should be understood as a single entity taking decisions for
a subset of the system thus effectively deciding how the
components in this subset should behave. When the system
is distributed, each user becomes its own authority, and the
terms can be used exchangeably. In the rest of this paper,
we will use ”authority” to describe an independent entity
which takes decision affecting a subset of the system. For
a centralised system, the authority is the one in control. For
a distributed system, authorities are the users. For a federated
system, authorities are the nodes trusted by the users.
In a distributed network, users can choose who to trust, to
which degree each node should be trusted or even decide not to
trust anyone. In some cases, a decentralised system can also be
used to reach an internal consensus without knowing which
authorities to trust. This problem was called the Byzantine
generals problem by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [11].
In a federated network with few authorities, like today’s
Internet, you either have to trust some of the authorities in
place or to develop new mechanisms that allow running appli-
cations on an untrusted infrastructure. Applied cryptography
focuses on the latter choice, allowing users to transmit in-
formation and compute through insecure mediums, emulating
the existence of trusted party [12]. Cryptography enables an
important paradigm shift in our society: from trusting people
or legal entities (because we have no other choices) to trusting
mathematics [13].
Even when the network is technically decentralised, a
federation of a small number of authorities opens the door
to a potential recentralisation through collusions of those
authorities. There is a strong economic incentive for collusion
and recentralisation [2]. But there are many cases where that
centralisation is not desirable or is even dangerous [5]. Is the
recentralisation unavoidable? Some decentralisation networks
have shown a great resilience against centralisation, like the
BitTorrent network which offers incentives to cooperation [14]
despite several attempts to shut it down or at least control it
to avoid its use to share copyrighted material.
To further analyse the situation, we felt that the cen-
tralised/decentralised notion was not enough of a character-
isation of the systems if we wanted to study the possibilities
of online voting on a decentralised system. Indeed, we under-
stood that a network could evolve and become centralised even
though it was decentralised at some point. For online voting
systems, we look for guarantees that hold in the long term.
Everlasting privacy is an example of such requirement [15].
We then looked for a characterisation of a system that would
offer us a guarantee of everlasting decentralisation.
III. INTRODUCING UNCENTRALISABILITY
Decentralised systems, as defined by Troncoso, Isaakidis,
Danezis and Halpin [3], are only decentralised at one point in
time. They are vulnerable to recentralisation through concen-
tration of power. We say that a system is recentralised if one
single authority has to be trusted by all users of the system.
This means that this particular entity can take a unilateral
decision that affects the whole system. Users are forced to
accept the decisions as long as they want to use the system.
We foresee two ways to concentrate power in an initially
decentralised system: by 1) collusion of authorities or by 2)
disappearance of authorities. We formalise this notion by say-
ing that a system S is decentralised if it has N authorities with
N ≫ 1. To ease the reasoning, we will use a simplification
and consider that S is decentralised if N > 1. In reality,
we envision that the number of independent nodes needed to
guarantee the decentralisation of a system will vary or even
lead to a ”degree of decentralisation” which is outside the
scope of this paper.
We use the notation:
S(A1, A2, . . . , An) (1)
to indicate that a system S is controlled by authorities
A1, A2, . . . , An. We will often use the notation Ai...j to refer
to the set of authorities {Ai, . . . , Aj}.
S will become centralised if the authorities in A1...n collude
or are controlled by a global authority B. In which case, N =
1 and S is centralised.
A1...n ⊂ B ⇒ S(A1, A2, . . . , An) = S(B) (2)
It is important to note that collusion of existing local
authorities can be done in the open (acquisition, merge),
be hidden (a single shadow authority control multiple local
authorities) or happen through an oligopolistic agreement.
S will also become centralised if A2...n disappear from the
system. N becomes 1 and S is centralised.
S(A1...n −A2...n) = S(A1) (3)
A historical example includes the XMPP federated chat
network. The network was fully decentralised, but Google Talk
quickly became the most prominent actor. In 2013, Google
decided unilaterally to leave the XMPP federation. Google
users with google-only contacts saw no impact. But people
using other servers than Google were suddenly forced to create
Google accounts if they wanted to chat with their Google
friends [16]. While the XMPP network survived and is still
in use today, that single decision from a single authority had
a deep impact on users, even those who didn’t trust Google
directly but had Google contacts. Users who trusted Google
were suddenly in a centralised system.
This example illustrates that decentralisation at one point in
time gives no guarantee for the future. If decentralisation is
critical, it should be guaranteed. For that reason, we introduce
uncentralisability as a property of decentralisation guaranteed
in time.
A system is uncentralisable if it can run and evolve without
the participation or consent of any particular authority, even
distributed.
But is uncentralisability possible and provable? We will
first explore a strict definition of uncentralisability through
a notion that we call strong uncentralisability. We will then
relax our definition to make it more practical and introduce
soft uncentralisability.
A. Strong uncentralisability
We define a strong uncentralisable system as a system in
which it is strictly impossible for a given entity to gain enough
influence to control the system. To guarantee that impossibility,
the system needs to be resilient against collusions of existing
authorities and the disappearance of authority nodes. Strong
uncentralisability can be seen as a perfect property, leading to
an ideally decentralised system.
Resisting against collusion, as seen in (2) means that the
more influence an authority has, the harder gaining influence
should be. As collusion can be hidden, there should be an in-
centive for each individual authority to remain independent. A
local authority should maximise its self-interest by remaining
independent.
S(A1, A2)⇒ A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ (4)
As some authorities may disappear, sometimes suddenly,
as seen in 3, another property of a strong uncentralisable
system is that it should be easy to create a new authority
that has immediate influence and could counter-balance other
authorities.
∃An+1 * A1...n : S(A1...n) + S(An+1) = S(A1...n+1) (5)
The difficulty is that An+1 has to be created as soon as
N ≤ 1, which implies that the system must know N at any
time.
We observe that (5) is also a solution against collusion as
seen is (2). If a strong uncentralisable system can exist, then all
the authorities have to actively collaborate not to merge or to
split/create a new authority as soon as the number of authority
is too low. As the collusion might be external to the system
itself, and thus undetectable by the system, decentralisation
could be possible only if there is an incentive to do so.
A system is said to be strongly uncentralisable if the
incentive for each individual authority to remain decentralised
is stronger than any incentive to political recentralisation.
As the tendency to recentralise is mostly economic, it would
make sense to build an uncentralisable system where there is
an economic incentive to remain distributed. People working to
keep the system distributed would be economically rewarded.
But this idealisation fails to be resilient against Sybil attacks.
A centralised authority may act like multiple decentralised
authorities, taking centralised decisions without letting users
know about it. Because of that, it might be impossible to
guarantee the strong uncentralisability of a system or even
to build such system.
To make it more practical, we relax our requirements and
introduce a soft uncentralisability notion.
B. Soft uncentralisability
Since a strongly uncentralisable system could be overly
demanding or even impossible to build, we realised that
we could potentially infer some interesting properties of a
system which, while not permanently decentralised, could
be made decentralised at any time. We called that property
soft uncentralisability. Unlike strong uncentralisability, which
guarantees a permanent decentralisation, soft uncentralisability
only guarantees decentralisation when needed.
A system is softly uncentralisable if it guarantees that any
trusted authority can be untrusted at any time without affecting
the system.
In a softly uncentralised system, the system may temporarily
become centralised as long as every actor trusts the central
authority. But it will always be possible to create a new
authority without any interference from older authority. This
means that the central authority keeps that position only as
long as there is a complete trust from every actor.
Interestingly, we realise that soft uncentralisability is equiv-
alent to (5) but without the hard requirement of knowing N
at any time.
Soft uncentralisability (SU ) is thus a subset of Strong
uncentralisability (HU ). Strongly uncentralisable systems are
softly uncentralisable, but the opposite is not true.
SU ⊂ HU (6)
A decentralised system might not be softly uncentralisable
and, at some point, a softly uncentralisable system might not
be decentralised. Soft uncentralisability is a notion orthogonal
to decentralisation.
C. Perfect Forkabilty
Every decentralised system exists because there is a consen-
sus agreed in the form of a protocol. If the consensus is broken,
the decentralised system is forked in two new systems (which
are either centralised or decentralised). Blockchains related
projects usually differentiate backwards compatible fork (”soft
fork”) from non-backwards compatible fork (”hard fork”) [17].
As the XMPP example demonstrated, such a fork may impact
the whole system [16].
In the XMPP fork of 2013, one branch of the fork became
centralised (the Google one) and not the other. Intuitively, this
may be caused by the fact that each branch of the fork was very
different. Users were already on one side of the fork before
the fork happened. Would it be better if users could choose
their branch after the fork? We define the notion of Perfect
Forkability (PF ). In a Perfectly Forkable system, each branch
is treated in perfect equality. Each branch of the fork should
continue to work exactly as before, with the only exception
being the rule that created the disagreement leading to the
fork. A user of a perfectly forkable system should be, after
the fork, a user of both systems.
S(A1...n) = S1(A1...n) ∪ S2(A1...n) (7)
If perfect forkability is guaranteed, it should nevertheless be
rare enough and used only when no other solution is possible
to avoid a fragmentation of the community. There should
be an incentive to avoid forking, the convergence incentive.
The balance here is subtle because convergence incentive and
perfect forkability look contradictory.
This is not the case. A system might be perfectly forkable,
but forks should only happen when there is a clear disagree-
ment or a trust issue. Forks should not happen by accident but
only when there is a clear decision to do it that counterbalances
the convergence incentive.
We observe that if authorities have to choose one branch
after a fork, (7) is equivalent to (5). This would mean that
perfect forkability is a property of a system equivalent to soft
uncentralisability. Intuitively, this makes sense: if S(A1) be-
came centralised and A1 refuses to cooperate with a newcomer
A2, there will be a fork resulting in S1(A1) + S2(A1, A2).
To be softly uncentralisable, a system has to be perfectly
forkable. And if a system is perfectly forkable, it is softly
uncentralisable.
An ideal strongly uncentralisable system has both soft
uncentralisability and perfect forkability properties.
PF ≡ SU ⊂ HU (8)
Perfect forkability is usually impaired by the fact that one
branch of the fork will keep the name and credibility of the
initial project while the other branch has to build a new brand.
In an ideal perfectly forkable system, there is no trademark
allowing one authority to own the name of the project.
Open Source code in a git repository is an example of a
softly uncentralisable system.
Any user, even newcomer, could always contribute to the
code. The ultimate authority might be centralised but only as
long as everyone accepts it. In case of a disagreement, even a
temporary one, the code will be forked, but each project may
continue exactly as before (with the exception of the name,
which is a reason that explains why Open Source projects
trademark their name and logo). Every contributor of the initial
project automatically becomes a contributor to both branches
of the fork. Once some code has been released under an open
source license, it becomes virtually impossible to take over all
instance of that particular code.
In reality, the centralisation of the branding of a project
does not appear to be a major problem which could prevent
forking. It can be assumed that it is not impeding too much
the soft uncentralisability property. As a way to circumvent
that problem, forks use creative strategies: ”Bitcoin Cash”,
a fork of Bitcoin, use a very similar logo and advertises
itself as ”peer-to-peer electronic cash” [18], which is the title
of the original Bitcoin whitepaper [19]. Bitcoin Cash users
sometimes refer to it as ”the true Bitcoin” [20]. ”Ethereum
Classic” is a name that speaks for itself for an Ethereum fork.
It advertises itself as ”a continuation of the original Ethereum
blockchain” [21].
IV. INTRODUCING THE UNCENTRALISABLE LEDGER
PRIMITIVE
Now that we have defined uncentralisability, we consider
that the Bitcoin blockchain is a clear attempt at building an
uncentralisable ledger (if not one of the first). As pointed
out by Narayanan et al. [22, p.31], with the current state
of research, Bitcoin ironically works better in practice than
in theory. It is thus important to understand and analyse the
factors that come into play without relying blindly on the
initial system proposal [17].
To simplify further analysis of the uncentralisability prop-
erty in systems such as Bitcoin, we will introduce the ”uncen-
tralisable ledger” as a new ideal cryptographic primitive.
An uncentralisable ledger is a ledger which is softly uncen-
tralisable.
The direct consequence is that an uncentralisable ledger is
perfectly forkable.
As the term ”blockchain” has no strict definition and may
be used on projects with varying levels of similarity with
Bitcoin [23], introducing the ”uncentralisable ledger” primitive
gives us a framework to differentiate projects that relies on
uncentralisability, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, against other
projects that may use a lot of properties from the blockchain
technology but do not need the uncentralisability. This latter
category includes many private or permissioned blockchains
[21] where there is a clear central authority.
This new cryptographic primitive may also allow us to
identify strong security weaknesses in projects that presuppose
the uncentralisability property but use a ledger that has not
been demonstrated to be uncentralisable.
A. Properties of an uncentralisable ledger
Bonneau, Miller, Clark, Narayanan, Kroll and Felten in-
troduced a framework for characterising the stability of each
layer of Bitcoin [17] where stability means that the system
will continue to behave in a way that facilitates a functional
currency. As for the consensus protocol, the following prop-
erties have been identified to guarantee the stability of the
system: Eventual consensus (the nodes will at some point
agree), Exponential convergence (the probability of a fork of
depth n is O(2−n)), Liveness (new blocks may be added),
Correctness (Only correct transactions are included in the
longest chain) and Fairness (a miner with a proportion α of
the total computational power will mine a proportion ∼ α of
blocks).
Those properties are specific to the Bitcoin blockchain.
We will thus generalise those properties to an uncentralisable
ledger:
Immutability: Any new entry in the uncentralisable ledger
will eventually become impossible or exponentially hard to
alter or to remove. This property is essential to build a ledger.
Availability: The entire history of the ledger might be
accessed by any user at any time. If it is not the case, some
user may restrict access to the system, creating a political
centralisation. (It should be noted that some payload data
might be encrypted and thus not readable by all the users. This
is not in contradiction with the availability property as long
as the encrypted data are not a structural part of the ledger).
If this property is not met, a branch of a fork may have less
information than the other branch, meaning that the ledger is
not perfectly forkable and not uncentralisable.
Correctness: New entries to the ledger are guaranteed to
respect the rules of the ledger. Incorrect entries are guaranteed
to be found in a reasonable time. Rules of the ledger evolve
through consensus of all the authorities.
Perfect Forkability: In case of a disagreement, the ledger
might be forked. No branch of the fork are privileged, and
users of the original ledger should automatically become users
of both ledgers.
Convergence: The system tends to converge and has incen-
tives to avoid accidental forks. If this property is not met, a
ledger will easily split into multiple atomic ledgers, each of
them becoming centralised. As said above, there is a subtle
equilibrium between having perfect forkability and having
incentives not to use it.
V. UNCENTRALISABILITY GUARANTEED BY
PROOF-OF-WORK
A. Bitcoin economical incentive to uncentralisability
As a technical concept, blockchains are mainly a distributed
ledger mechanism. The concept has been studied and ex-
perimented before Bitcoin [23]. Bitcoin introduced two new
elements to the game. Firstly, the bitcoin consensus protocol
of which node should be added next was based on a proof-
of-work algorithm known as mining. Miners were rewarded
through the generation of bitcoins [22], p.105. Secondly,
bitcoins started being exchanged for fiat money. The exchange
rate gave bitcoins an economic value. The reasons behind
this economic value of Bitcoin can be discussed but was
envisioned since the start as an essential incentive to guarantee
the stability of the Bitcoin network [19] [17]. The original
design of Bitcoin considers that the combination of those two
elements is a strong economic incentive against centralisation
[19]. Unlike other Internet layers, were centralisation is eco-
nomically cheaper, on the Bitcoin blockchain, each actor has
a strong economic incentive to keep the system decentralised.
Even before Bitcoin, Aspnes, Jackson and Krishnamurthy
proposed a proof of work algorithm to mitigate Sybil attack on
the Byzantine’s generals problem [24]. With Bitcoin algorithm,
miners compete against each other to be the first to find the
next block. Other than the raw mining incentive, people willing
to publish a transaction in a block can also give incentives
in the form of a transaction fee. Miner will then select the
transactions with the highest fees and earn more.
The incentive for miners is thus clear: having the higher
possible hash rate. And the higher the global hash rate is for
the network, the harder it is to gain control over the blockchain
and the harder the problem becomes. Increasing your bitcoin
revenue through mining is exponentially harder: the more hash
rate, the harder the problem becomes [22], p. 108.
The incentive that guarantees the uncentralisable property
of the Bitcoin blockchain is economic. For each individual,
it is economically suitable to not collude with others. We can
thus conclude that Bitcoin is ”human greed based technology”.
The technical infrastructure (Bitcoin’s blockchain) purposely
exploits a generic trait of human psychology (greed) in order
to guarantee a technical feature (uncentralisability). The rise of
interest in blockchain technologies and the rise of the value of
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies implies an unalterable trust
toward human greed.
B. Is Bitcoin softly uncentralisable?
Is Bitcoin strongly uncentralisable? Kiayias, Koutsoupias,
Kyropoulou and Tselekounis demonstrated that a miner with
more than 30 or 40% of hashing power would be advantaged
and find more than 40% of the blocks if following a dishonest
strategy [25]. A trend towards centralisation has been observed
in mining [26], confirming that the proof of work algorithm
used by Bitcoin is not strongly-uncentralisable. Centralisation
in the Bitcoin mining business is well known and sometimes
referred as ASIC-powered centralisation [27].
But what are the consequences of a single, possibly shadow
authority having most of the hashing power? It means that that
particular authority could be the only one able to propose new
blocks to the blockchains. It should be highlighted that those
blocks have to be valid. Thus, the central authority may block
some transactions by not including them in any block or raise
transaction fees [28].
This is not seen as a major problem as long as the nodes
of the Bitcoin network have the power to decide which code
to run and which rules to follow [17]. The particular imple-
mentation of the proof-of-work in Bitcoin might be compared
to the legislative/executive separation of powers seen in most
modern democracies. Nodes connected to the network decide
which code to run (legislative power) while miners create new
blocks that follow those rules (executive power).
It should be remarked that the number of nodes is not
important: each node will agree with nodes that follow the
same rules. If a node finds a longer blockchain with an
incorrect block, it will dismiss it as incorrect [28].
This makes controlling the nodes useless for any attack
against the network itself. This is not true for attacks against
individuals. Sybil attacks may be launched against a single
node. If this node connects only to nodes controlled by an
attacker, the attacker is in position to hide some blocks and
thus launch a double-spending attack. This double-spending
will eventually be found when the victim node eventually
connects to an honest node.
If the centralisation of mining becomes problematic, a
proposal could be made to modify the proof of work algorithm,
making current mining hardware useless. As soon as the
nodes update to that particular algorithm, miners lose all their
authority [28]. If there is a disagreement in the community,
the system is forked. In theory, Bitcoin should be perfectly
forkable. It was demonstrated to be the case in August 2017
with Bitcoin Cash [18]. Despite many concern about central-
isation of mining [29], Bitcoin appears softly uncentralisable.
The Bitcoin Wiki even considers the possibility of a manual
fork of the code of the nodes to prune a malevolent branch of
the blockchain, even though this chain would have required
more computation power.
”It’s much more difficult to change historical blocks,
and it becomes exponentially more difficult the fur-
ther back you go. As above, changing historical
blocks only allows you to exclude and change the
ordering of transactions. If miners rewrite historical
blocks too far back, then full nodes with pruning
enabled will be unable to continue, and will shut
down; the network situation would then probably
need to be untangled manually (e.g. by updating
the software to reject this chain even though it is
longer).” ( [28])
To follow the legislative analogy, we can say that the law is
the protocol (or the source code). The nodes are the members
of parliament who vote to modify the law. Miners are the
executive power following the law.
We conclude that Bitcoin soft uncentralisability seems guar-
anteed by a complex mix of separation of power and economic
incentives, but a formal proof is yet to be found.
VI. OTHER CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS
Proof-of-work is only one of the many consensus algorithms
being currently developed. Proof-of-stake is one of the most
popular alternatives which can take many forms, for example
[30]. The Algorand [31], IOTA’s Tangle [32] or proof-of-space
[33] are other consensus algorithms that aim to solve the
Byzantine generals problem.
We believe that studying the uncentralisability of those
algorithms and potentially proving formally their uncentralis-
ability could help to understand them better and predict their
resilience against potential recentralisation.
VII. VOTING ON A CENTRALISED INFRASTRUCTURE
In a centralised institution, voting is a particularly sensitive
matter. Most of the time, the central authority who organises
the elections has a strong incentive to ”win”, even through
cheating. In the same way that people want to transmit secure
information through insecure mediums, voters want to ensure
that the election is correct even though it is organised by an
untrusted central authority.
This has been the focus of the development of end-to-end
verifiable systems, since the seminal works of Chaum [34],
and Benaloh and Fischer [35]. The extraordinary challenge
addressed in these works is to build a system that protects
voter privacy (only the voter knows her vote, apart from what
could be derived from the election results) while enabling each
voter to verify that his vote was cast as intended, recorded as
cast, and that all and only votes submitted by authorised voters
are properly counted.
While being fully verifiable, most of these systems in-
clude strongly centralised components, and election organisers
could, alone or jointly, make an election fail.
This is the case in traditional paper-based elections: an
authority needs to provide a list of polling places and, if these
polling places are later closed, then the election will simply
not take place. This is clearly orthogonal to verifiability and,
indeed, any observer would be able to verify that polling places
are closed. A similar thing happens in most verifiable internet
voting systems. For instance, in the Helios system [36], [37],
an URL at which votes must be cast is provided as part of
the election definition. If the authority maintaining this URL
takes it down, then the election will fail.
VIII. VOTING ON AN UNCENTRALISABLE LEDGER
At first glance, voting on an uncentralisable ledger instead
of a centralised server would mainly help with transparency
and auditability (counted as recorded) [38]. Another aspect
improved by the use of an uncentralisable ledger would be
robustness as it would become very hard for an attacker to
take down the infrastructure.
Most Electronic Voting solutions require, at some point, a
Bulletin Board in which public information can be added but
never altered. Distributed ledgers, built specifically for a given
election, where even considered as design for an electronic
election system such as The Auditorium [39].
But none of those advantages makes an uncentralisable
ledger a revolution in Internet voting. It could make it easier.
But voting systems can be built and have been built without
using this primitive.
We believe that the interesting question is: what are the
possibilities enabled by an uncentralisable ledger that were
impossible or considered as such before? Sociologists know
that technology has a strong influence on the society we build.
Building centralised technologies, such as nuclear power plant,
lead to authoritarian and centralised states while decentralised
technologies may lead to more decentralised societies with
more individual freedom and autonomy [40]. Wouldn’t an in-
centralisable voting system deeply change the way we envision
collective decision taking?
IX. NEW WAYS TO APPREHEND AN ELECTION
The main properties of an uncentralisable ledger are im-
mutability, availability, correctness, perfect forkability and
convergence.
The availability and immutability properties allow recon-
sidering the timing of elections. Voting is not something done
once in a while, with a campaign and planning, but can become
permanent. After all, decisions have to be taken all the time
in an ever-evolving context.
It is then possible to imagine a direct democracy system
in which any voter has the right to write proposals and to
submit them to the vote. Each proposal would have a deadline
and would be marked as accepted by the community if it
reaches a given amount of vote before the deadline. While
such platforms already exist without an uncentralisable ledger,
they always had to be run by a particular authority which had
administrator rights on the platform.
This, of course, raises a lot of practical questions but the
mere existence of an uncentralisable permanent and trustable
infrastructure allows to think about new forms of governance
or democracy [41]. In fact, those new form of government
might even be urgently needed as there is an increasing
conflict between the daily life of citizen (immediateness, self-
sovereignty of actions) and the reality of a slow heavily
centralised administration [42].
As an example, the Australian project VoteFlux1 proposed
a liquid democracy system, including delegations, but with
an incentive to not vote in order to transfer votes from
unimportant issues to the more important one. Studying the
implications of such voting system is outside of the scope
of this paper, but it is interesting to note that their design
(including voting token), while not explicitly referring to the
blockchain, seems a lot easier to implement on a blockchain
than on any other system. VoteFlux was implemented using
Secure.Vote which is a blockchain based voting solution [43].
1voteflux.org
One of the features of some famous uncentralisable ledgers
is the existence of tokens, which exist in a limited supply and
which have an economic value.
Uncentralisable blockchains, valuable tokens and smart con-
tracts allow the implementation of decentralised prediction
markets. Such tools can be transformed into governance sys-
tems that implement a futarchist institution [44]. Another idea
would be a voting platform linked to a decentralised reputation
system, allowing people with more reputation to have more
power, creating the first completely formalised meritocracy.
Another property which is interesting to consider is the
perfect forkability. In case of a strong bipolar disagreement
in a community, the community could fork. This, of course,
raises the question of the physical infrastructure that cannot be
forked but is an interesting lead for virtual communities. Being
able to perfectly fork a community would probably change the
way we envision conflict management and disagreement.
X. EXISTING BLOCKCHAIN VOTING PROJECTS
Nowadays, the term blockchain is widely used with various
meanings. Multiple tech projects advertise themselves as ”us-
ing blockchain” or being ”blockchain related”. The blockchain
is also sometimes seen as the bread and butter, the silver
bullet that will solve every problem and will make everything
decentralisable. This belief sometimes also applies to e-voting
where ”voting on the blockchain” is seen as a miracle cure.
We have chosen to study existing public projects that
advertise themselves as voting solutions (voting is the primary
feature) based on the blockchain. We did not consider projects
which may be implemented using blockchain-like technologies
but did not advertise themselves as ”blockchain based”.
For each project, we investigated two aspects: 1) is the
project built on an uncentralisable ledger and 2) is the project
technically assuming uncentralisability.
We consider that by advertising themselves as
”blockchain-base”, those projects try to appear as
”decentralised/uncentralisable” in the public eye. We
can then analyse if 1) the project may be uncentralisable and
2) the project needs that uncentralisability.
It should be noted that new projects appear every day. This
list should not be considered as exhaustive nor definitive.
A. FollowMyVote
FollowMyVote2 is an open source project developed by
a US non-profit and implements different voting systems:
Proportional Representation, Mixed Member and Majority.
The handling of elections is traditional and requires a central
authority to handle identities and voter accreditation.
FollowMyVote implements its own blockchain. This has
the unfortunate side-effect of making the blockchain easily
centralisable. In the current state, FollowMyVote should be
considered as a traditional centralised implementation using
blockchain technology, not as an uncentralisable project.
2https://followmyvote.com/
B. Procivis
Procivis3 is commercial Swiss company that develops an
e-voting solution in cooperation with the University of Zurich
[45]. The Procivis solution uses the Ethereum blockchain
which is softly uncentralisable.
While the counting is done on the blockchain, each voter
should use a dedicated client to cast her vote. A prototype
of one has been developed in Java but, in theory, voters
could develop their own. Unfortunately, the smart contracts
has to be deployed in a semi-private network, allowing a
central authority to choose which nodes may run an instance
of the voting software [46]. This is an important point: being
based on a uncentralisable ledger, in this case, the Ethereum
blockchain, does not guarantee uncentralisability.
Code is announced to become open source. The Procivis
solution relies on a central authority to provide ID and voter
registration, in this case, the Swiss state. It should be noted
that Procivis is also working on identity through eID+ and
Valid4, the later being blockchain based.
C. Secure.vote
Secure.vote5 implements a commercial liquid voting solu-
tion where voters can delegate their vote.
The system is blockchain agnostic and can be run on any
blockchain. Initially built for VoteFlux, the project pivoted
and is now currently focused on a specific niche: enabling
a community to vote on the specific rules governing an Initial
Coin Offering (ICO). With that specific use case in mind,
Secure.vote makes a lot of sense when used on the blockchain
of the project itself.
While the code is announced to be inspectable, it will
not be free. Without unrestricted access to the source code,
perfect forkability is impossible, guaranteeing that Secure.vote
is centralised.
D. The Open Vote Network
The Open Vote Network [47] is a research project using
smart contracts on the Ethereum platform. For performance
reasons, the project is focused on small elections, such as
boardroom elections. Identity of the voters must be known
before hand.
It implements on the Ethereum blockchain the voting pro-
tocol called ”Anonymous voting by two-round public discus-
sion” [48]. It should then be considered as a ”classic” voting
system which could be implemented without the blockchain.
Code is Open Source6.
E. Polys
Polys7 is a commercial voting project started by the private
company Kaspersky. It uses a private Ethereum blockchain
3http://procivis.ch
4https://valid.global
5http://secure.vote/
6https://github.com/stonecoldpat/anonymousvoting
7http://polys.me/
wich means that, while voting can be decentralised, there is
no guarantee of uncentralisability.
While no code has been released yet, the project was
announced to become Open Source.
F. Votem
Votem8 is a commercial voting solution that claims to
implement voting on a blockchain. From their documentation,
it is clear that they use their own private blockchain, thus not
using any uncentralisable feature.
It should be noted that no source code could be found
nor any information about a potential release under an Open
Source license.
Votem announced an ICO. At the time of this writing, they
did not release any whitepaper, ICO plan or source code.
G. VOLT project
The VOLT Project9 is an academical research project
that aims to explore the voting possibilities offered by the
blockchain. No source code has been currently released. They
first want to explore non-political voting scheme, such as
shareholder voting. While such use cases are interesting,
they do not take advantage of the uncentralisability of the
blockchain.
H. Democracy.earth
Democracy.earth10 is currently one of the most innovative
projects when it comes to voting on a blockchain.
Based on the Ethereum blockchain, which is softly uncen-
tralisable, the project implements a liquid democracy solution,
where users can vote or delegate their vote. Users can also
submit proposals. The identity of the voters is handled by
the project itself in a decentralised way, making it a true
standalone tool for flat governance.
Democracy.earth is the only studied project which seems
to implement an uncentralisable voting solution, making it a
compelling test case to study the impact of uncentralisability
on voting and governance. The project is still under develop-
ment and some concerns should be made, especially regarding
the secrecy of the vote which is not perfectly guaranteed.
I. Related Project: DCent
DCent11 is an European funded multidisciplinary project ex-
ploring the future of democracy. The name itself is a reference
to decentralisation. We did not include them on our short list
because it uses the voting platform nVotes12, previously known
as AgoraVote, which does not use the blockchain and which
is a centralised voting solution.
It is interesting to note that DCent indirectly uses the
blockchain through a crypto-asset called Freecoin13 which is
built to incentive participation in the democratic process.
8https://www.votem.io/
9http://www.volt-project.org/
10http://democracy.earth/
11https://dcentproject.eu
12https://nvotes.com
13https://freecoin.dyne.org/
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FollowMyVote Non-profit Yes No No
Procivis Commercial Planned No No
Secure.vote Commercial No No No
Open Vote Academic Yes Yes No
Polys Commercial Planned No No
Votem Commercial No No No
VOLT Academic Unreleased Not yet Not yet
Democracy.earth Community Yes Yes Yes
Out of eight analysed projects claiming to be ”blockchain
based”, only one ends up using uncentralisability as a core
feature. Three of the projects even appear to be strongly
centralised. Fortunately, no project assumed uncentralisability
while using a centralised blockchain.
This result demonstrates the usefulness of the uncentralis-
ability concept as it allows to differentiate projects and quickly
identify important features.
There is nothing bad about using a centralised blockchain as
long as the project itself is considered as clearly centralised.
Projects based on an uncentralisable blockchain may, in the
future, develop new features based on that uncentralisability.
This is not the case for projects based on centralisable or
centralised blockchains.
XI. OTHER GOVERNANCE SOLUTION RELATED TO THE
BLOCKCHAIN
It is interesting to note that multiple projects address the
governance problem without advertising themselves as voting
platforms. They try to address the governance of collectivity
from the point of view of project management solutions
which is the kind of governance mostly seen in the industry.
The concept is sometimes referred to as DAO (Decentralised
Autonomous Organisation) and is perceived as a new form of
organisation in direct competition with other institutions such
as companies, markets, networks or even governments [49].
To illustrate this particular aspect, we selected three popular
projects. This small list is not exhaustive and only serves as
an example.
A. Colony.io
Colony.io14 advertises itself as a platform for open or-
ganisations. The stated goal of Colony.io is to handle large
projects with multiple stakeholders and multiple contributors.
The platform includes project management features such a
14https://colony.io/
task management, a token used to reward users for their
contribution and a reputation platform.
Reputation is one of the core features of Colony.io. Rep-
utation is earned in both ”fields” and ”skills” by completing
tasks that are then judged by the task initiator.
Colony.io is permissive by default. Voting is seen only as a
rare measure that should happen only when there is a dispute
to settle. Initiating the dispute implies putting some token at
stake, token that can be lost. The vote is meritocratic, the
importance of a vote being pondered by the reputation of the
voter. The voters share 10% of the tokens at stake as a reward
for taking part in the vote [17].
While the whole system seems highly dedicated to indus-
trial collaboration, one example being the rLoop project15,
Colony.io exemplifies and codifies the meritocratic political
process.
B. Backfeed
Backfeed16 has similar foundations to Colony.io but with
a more specialised approach toward reputation. In Backfeed,
reputation is an essential tool that works as an incentive for
voting.
Interestingly enough, reputation can be earned for voting
early for the future consensus. Reputation is thus proportional
to the ability to predict the outcome of a vote. While this is
not explicitly mentioned in the Backfeed whitepaper (which is
still being edited) [50], this makes backfeed similar to some
futarchist models.
Backfeed votes are public. There is not voter privacy.
C. Aragon
While it is philosophically similar to Colony.io and Back-
feed, Aragon17 aims to create a global decentralised jurisdic-
tion, hence encompassing the need for one single organisation.
It could be seen as a network of organisations or an organisa-
tion of organisations.
The proposed system seems to be a mix between liquid
democracy and futarchy, allowing token holders to make
proposals and to vote, rewarding voters who voted for the
accepted decision [51]. As with Backfeed, publicity of the
votes is an essential tool to allow building reputation.
XII. THE HARD PROBLEM OF IDENTITY
An essential aspect of elections is the identity of the voter.
Identity, possibly guaranteed through pseudonyms as proposed
by Chaum [34], is needed to ensure that a given voter has the
credential to vote and votes only once, as a way to guarantee
political equality (even if, in some cases, these votes can carry
different weights).
If the number of votes is not limited, the election becomes
meaningless as the outcome is decided by the voters that have
the most efficient voting strategy.
15http://www.rloop.org/
16http://backfeed.cc/
17https://aragon.one/
That’s why most electronic vote solution takes for granted
the existence of a central authority issuing voting tokens to
people allowed to vote. The existence of this token, which
is implicit in the case of a list of registered voters, ensures
that only allowed people vote and vote only once (or only
the number of tokens they have received). A popular way of
cheating the system is by using the token of a deceased person.
Of the explored voting solutions, only Democracy.earth
addresses the identity problem. It is no coincidence if it is
also the only project actively exploiting uncentralisability.
Several other blockchain related projects try to address the
hard identity problem. They try to create a self-sovereign
(each user owns and controls her own identity) and secure
identity system based on an uncentralisable ledger. Evernym18,
Civic19, Uport20, Cryptid21, ShoCard22, TrustStamp23, Democ-
racy.earth or IDBox24 are examples of project trying to create
an uncentralisable and self-sovereign identity solution based
on the blockchain.
The World Food Program is currently experimenting with a
blockchain-based identity platform for refugees. Called WFP
Building Blocks, the project uses the Ethereum Blockchain
[52].
Analysing them is outside of the scope of this article. But
the number of existing projects underlines a widely spread
desire to create a decentralised identity solution and the strong
belief that uncentralisable ledgers make it possible. It is
interesting to note that some projects, such as WFP Building
Blocks and IDBox, aim at solving the identity problem in
situation when a central authority is not available, reliable or
trustable.
The other strategy would be for pure voting systems like
Procivis or Secure.vote to connect themselves to external
identity providers. Such ”Identity as a Service” providers
probably make sense in the long term.
XIII. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE OF OPEN SOURCE
PROJECTS
Even the most decentralised projects, like Democracy.earth,
still have one big central authority: the source code. Special
attention should be paid to the governance of the code itself.
It seems intuitive enough that the code needs to be completely
open source but even open source projects have various strate-
gies of governance which have a series of trade-offs in terms of
democratic governance, flexibility, and ability to evolve [53].
One essential tool of open source governance is the fork, which
allows any project to be split into two independents projects.
When an uncentralisable blockchain related project is forked,
this sometimes implies that the blockchain itself is forked, a
phenomenon called ”hard-fork”.
18https://www.evernym.com/
19https://www.civic.com/products/secure-identity-platform
20https://www.uport.me/
21http://cryptid.xyz/
22https://shocard.com/
23https://truststamp.net/
24http://www.idbox.io/
There were hard-forks on the two main uncentralisable
blockchains (Bitcoin and Ethereum), leading to the creation
of entirely new assets (Bitcoin cash, Ethereum classic) with
their own exchange value. In all the recorded cases, one
branch of the fork continued to be considered as the canonical,
initial project. But it is unclear what will happen if there
is no consensus about what should be the canonical project
after a hard fork, especially when the blockchain is used by
applications such as voting and identity providing solutions.
Studying the impacts of coding governance strategies, in-
cluding hard-fork, might be especially important for projects
that are used to take collective decisions on a large scale.
XIV. CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduced several concepts: uncentral-
isability, soft uncentralisability, strong uncentralisability and
perfect forkability. We reasoned that soft uncentralisability
was equivalent to perfect forkability and was a property
strong enough to guarantee the decentralisation of a system
in the long term. One of the main findings is that a softly
uncentralisable system might be centralised at some point in
time.
We were then able to define a new cryptographic primitive
called ”uncentralisable ledger”. We explored some properties
of an uncentralisable ledger and argued that the Bitcoin’s
blockchain is an attempt at building such primitive.
While not strictly necessary, such uncentralisable
blockchains may help to implement an electronic voting
system. But they also enable the implementation of
completely new voting paradigms.
We reviewed several existing electronic voting projects
advertising themselves as voting solutions based on the
blockchain. Using the uncentralisability concept proved to be
useful to differentiate those projects and their potential for
the future. From the reviewed projects, only Democracy.earth
leverages the power of uncentralisable ledgers, making it the
only project in the list that could not be implemented without
an uncentralisable ledger.
Democracy.earth has the specificity of implementing its own
self-sovereign and uncentralisable identity provider. Identity is
a key component of any voting system, and uncentralisable
ledgers enable experimentations about building self-sovereign
and uncentralisable identity providers, allowing complete self-
governance without any central authority.
As a last point, we also observed that any uncentralisable
ledger software should be open source, open source projects
being themselves softly-uncentralisable. We conclude by rais-
ing the point that studying the governance of open source
projects behind an uncentralisable ledger is important.
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